La ei si la noi

Scurt si la obiect despre ce inseamna un govern care are suficienta inteligenta colectiva sa gandeasca un plan, mai bun sau mai prost, si suficienta capacitate administrative sa incerce sa-l implementeze:D. La noi dl. Boco declara ca “Banii de la Comisia Europeana din cadrul acordului de imprumut cu FMI nu se vor folosi pentru plata salariilor si pensiilor, ci pentru acoperirea deficitului bugetar”, iar Mr. Geoana cel din ce in ce mai sexos declara ca “Banii de la FMI se vor folosi pentru acoperirea deficitului balantei de plati”. Aferim:D

Chrysler and General Motors End game
Apr 30th 2009 From The Economist print edition
The two carmakers’ new, streamlined shapes start to become apparent
AFTER a week of brinkmanship, it seemed that the effort to save Chrysler from bankruptcy had failed. As The Economist went to press, Barack Obama was expected to announce that last-ditch negotiations between the Treasury and secured creditors had broken down, leaving the smallest of Detroit’s Big Three no other option than to file for Chapter 11 protection. However, Mr Obama was also expected to confirm that a deal had been reached with the Italian carmaker Fiat, offering a reorganised Chrysler a realistic prospect of emerging from bankruptcy quickly and tapping $6 billion in new federal loans.
As the administration’s April 30th deadline for achieving an out-of-court restructuring of Chrysler neared, it appeared that the Treasury’s twisting of arms and banging of heads was getting results. On April 27th the United Auto Workers (UAW) union agreed to a series of concessions, including the suspension of cost-of-living adjustments, restrictions on overtime pay and, most dramatically, that half of Chrysler’s contribution to a union-managed health-care fund for retired workers could be paid in the form of a big equity stake, rather than cash.
The next day a group of four lenders holding 70% of Chrysler’s $6.9 billion of secured loans caved in to demands that they swap their debt for $2 billion in cash. As recipients of government bail-out funds, the four banks—JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley—were in a weak position to resist political pressure. But the Treasury had no such leverage with the 40 or so smaller banks and hedge funds that hold the rest of the senior debt. Despite a slightly improved offer from the Treasury, they voted on April 29th to take their chances of getting a better settlement from a bankruptcy court.
Mr Obama and Sergio Marchionne, Fiat’s boss, appear confident that enough groundwork has been done to allow a “surgical” Chapter 11 bankruptcy and a speedy sale of non-core assets to pay off debtholders, taking no more than three or four weeks to complete. Bankruptcy should also make it easier for the “new” Chrysler to shed unwanted dealers and other liabilities. But there are uncertainties. Some creditors could insist that the company is worth more to them in liquidation than as a going concern.
The administration dismisses the possibility of Chrysler being broken up. Assuming it is right, on Chrysler’s emergence from bankruptcy, Fiat would immediately receive a 20% stake in exchange for running the business and supplying the small-car platforms and fuel-efficient powertrains it urgently needs. Fiat’s stake would rise to 35% as long as it meets various targets set by the Treasury. The UAW trust would get 55%, while the government and, potentially, those lenders willing to take equity, would end up with the remaining 10%. Contrary to some reports, the Treasury does not believe that the court will demand that Fiat put up any of its own cash, nor will it consider doing so.
If anything, the structure proposed this week for a reorganised General Motors (GM) by its new boss, Fritz Henderson, is even more extraordinary. On April 27th Mr Henderson put forward a restructuring plan that would result in the government taking a 50% shareholding in the company by way of payment for half the $15.4 billion loan GM has already received, and the additional $11.6 billion it hopes to get at the end of May—its deadline for demonstrating that it has a future. Like Chrysler, GM also proposes giving the UAW health-care trust fund a big chunk of equity—about 39%—instead of $10.2 billion in cash.
But although Mr Henderson can be confident that the government and the union will back his plan, there is rather more doubt whether he will be able to bully investors into exchanging $27 billion of unsecured debt for a 10% equity stake. He has warned that unless the holders of 90% of the debt accept the offer, it will not go through. He also announced a series of measures to cut costs and streamline the business, including the closure of 2,641 GM dealers—42% of the total—and a reduction in the number of workers paid by the hour from 61,000 to 40,000 by the end of 2010.
Mr Henderson wants GM to be capable of breaking even in a domestic car market of 10m sales a year, which is close to today’s depressed level. In a slightly more normal market and with a share of 18.5% compared with the 22.1% it held last year, GM would be decently profitable by 2014. According to one GM insider, it is all a lot more brutal than anything Rick Wagoner, Mr Henderson’s predecessor, would ever have had the stomach for.
But the glaring weakness of the proposal is its reliance on debtholders’ willingness to accept less than eight cents on the dollar on even the most optimistic equity-valuation assumptions. This looks mean next to the more favourable treatment of the UAW trust, which is owed $20.4 billion by GM and will receive 50% in cash and an equity stake four times larger than that being offered to debtholders. A committee representing some of the bondholders says their legal rights are no different from the union’s. In a statement it said: “We believe the offer to be a blatant disregard of fairness for the bondholders who have funded this company and amounts to using taxpayers’ money to show political favouritism of one creditor over another.”
True, if GM were to enter the bankruptcy courts, as holders of unsecured debt the bondholders could be wiped out entirely. But a sympathetic judge might insist that they be treated on a more equal basis with the union. Unless Mr Henderson finds a way of greatly sweetening the offer before its expiry on May 26th, most bondholders are likely to conclude they have little to lose by trying their luck in court. After the similar display of stubbornness by Chrysler’s lenders, that appears overwhelmingly the most likely outcome.